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INTRODUCTION
Critical Infrastructures work together to produce goods and 
services. For example, the power station generates electricity 
and the water purification station uses the electricity to 
produce drinking water. Disruption of Civil Infrastructures 
will affect our national security, economic well  being and 
way of life. This provides a primary motivation to model 
and understand the interaction between infrastructures. 
Based on our works in military modeling and simulation 
(M&S), we have extended these M&S methodologies to the 
area of Critical Infrastructure Protection. However, we 
observed that it take a reasonable amount of modeling effort 
to model a large network of infrastructures.
There is a need to provide quick answer to operational 
users. It is sometimes sufficient to have a ballpark estimate of 
the consequence of a possible disruption in the infrastructure 
network. This will also assist them to decide on a smaller 
subset of infrastructures to do detailed modeling and analysis 
later. 
In this workshop, we are proposing to model each 
infrastructure & its interactions by Network Topology. We 
implemented this methodology in the NetLogo software. The 
following sections will  discuss our objective for this 
workshop, describe the scenarios ran during the workshop 
and highlight some lessons learnt.
DURING THE WORKSHOP 
Workshop Objective
In this workshop, we used a case study to evaluate the 
feasibility of this methodology to model the interaction 
between infrastructures. The case study here is a  military 
supply chain network model. The initial military supply 
chain model is developed by Vidal  [1]. For the purpose of 
this workshop, we added some modifications to this model. 
The objective is to design a military supply chain with 
better survivability. The model consists of three types of 
battalions namely, Main Supply Battalion (MSB), Forward 
Supply Battalion (FSB) and combat battalion.  A MSB supplies 
goods to a group of FSBs and each FSB in turn feeds the goods 
to a  number of combat battalions. We are interested to 
determine how different configurations of MSBs, FSBs and 
battalion will affect the network survivability.
Network survivability
Survivability is defined as Robustness, Responsiveness and 
Flexibility. Robustness looks at how the size of the network 
changes when some nodes are removed. Responsiveness 
measures how quickly some commodities can flow through 
a network when some nodes are attacked and fail. Flexibility 
focuses on whether alternate paths exist in a network so that 
commodity can continue to flow to others nodes after some 
node failures. To measure these parameters, we have to 
compute the characteristic path length and the largest 
component of the network. The characteristics path length 
calculates the average number of links required to connect 
each node to every other nodes in the network while the 
largest component of the network determines the maximum 
number of nodes that continue to link to each other after 
some nodes are removed.
To look at how network structures will affect the network 
survivability, we considered three structures, namely Random 
network, Scale-free network and UltraLog network. 
Researchers have already studied the behavior of Random 
and Scale-free networks under different attack modes. In 
general, there are two attack modes, random attack and 
targeted attack. For random attack, the attacker chooses a 
node to disrupt at random. For targeted attack, the attacker 
has some information on how the nodes are linked to each 
other and will choose the most critical node for attack.
In a Scale-free network, when a new node joins the 
network, the probability that it will  attach to an existing node 
is proportional to the number of links that the node has. 
Hence, a  node with the most number of links is more likely to 
attract new node. Studies have shown that most real networks 
behave like the Scale-free network.
A Scale-free network is known to be resilient to random 
attack but is very vulnerable to targeted attack. This is because 
in a Scale-free network, there exist a  small number of critical 
nodes with many links. Hence, when the attackers pick a node 
at random, it is less likely that these critical nodes will be 
chosen. This intuitively explains the resilient response of the 
Scale-free network under random attack. However, these 
critical nodes have a great influence on the survivability of the 
entire network and when the attackers focus on the critical 
nodes, the Scale-free network will suffer a  serious 
consequence.
In Random network, nodes are attached to each other 
randomly. Hence, the response of a random network under 
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random attack is not much different from that of a targeted 
attack.
Thadakamalla et al  [2] proposed a network topology 
(herein known as UltraLog network) which is considered a 
hybrid between a Random network and a Scale-free network. 
It is suggested that the UltraLog model will be as efficient as 
the Scale-free network and yet perform better than the Scale-
free network under targeted attack.  
The UltraLog model is inherently hierarchical in nature. It 
consists of three layers, namely MSB, FSB and battalion. 
MSBs, FSBs and battalion enter the system in a certain ratio 
l:m:n where l > m > n:
a. A MSB has five edges pointing from it. 
b. A FSB has three edges pointing from it.
c. A battalion has one edge pointing from it and a 














Table 1: The configuration simulated during the workshop
Description of Scenario
In this workshop, we relaxed the ratio of MSBs, FSBs and 
battalion so that l ≥ m ≥ n. Table 1 shows the configurations 
studied during the workshop.
In addition to network configuration, we also modified 
the model so that there are four types of attack mode, namely 
random, targeted attack on critical node, targeted attack on 
critical node in largest component, targeted attack on critical 
node in smallest component. For more information on these 
attack modes, the readers can send the inquiry to the team.
We ran 30 replications of simulation for each 
configuration type and attack mode. After that, we compared 
the result with that of Scale-free and Random networks. The 
number of node used in each replication is 100 and one node 
is removed from the network at each time step. The 
simulation stops when 80% of the nodes are removed.
RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
For each configuration and attack mode, we computed the 
average value of the characteristic path length and the 
largest component at each time step and plotted them on a 
graph. Figure 1 and 2 show how the characteristic path 
length and the largest component behave for the three 
network structures for a given configuration, under targeted 
attack on critical node.
Figure 1: The average characteristic path length 
at each time step under targeted attack on critical node
In figure 1, it is observed that the rate of increase of the 
characteristic path length of the Scale-free network is higher 
than that of the other network structures. Furthermore, the 
Scale-free network starts to disintegrate at earlier time unit 
(i.e. time step = 21). On the other hand, the UltraLog model 
performs better than the Scale-free network but lag behind the 
random network.
In figure 2, it is again observed that the Scale-free 
network performs the worst among the three networks. For 
the Scale-free network, the value of largest component drops 
at a faster rate than that of the other two networks. 
Figure 2: The average largest component 
at each time step under targeted attack on critical node
For each configuration and attack mode, we plotted the 
characteristic path length and the largest component for the 
three networks and made visual comparison. We developed a 
simple scoring system to assess the performance of the 
UltraLog network. The following criteria  are used to award 
score to the UltraLog network: 
a. Under random attack, if the UltraLog network 
performs better than the Random network and the 
Scale-free network, a score of 1 is given.
b. Under random attack, if the UltraLog network 
performs better than the Random network but lags 
behind the Scale-free network, a score of 1 is still 
given.
c. Under targeted attack, if the UltraLog network 
performs better  than the Scale-free network and the 
Random network, a score of 1 is given.
d. Under targeted attack, if the UltraLog network 
performs better than the Scale-free network but lags 
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Red Boats
behind the Random network, a score of 1 is still 
given.
The result is shown in table 2. 
SUMMARY OF FINDINGS
Based on the simulations ran, we observed that the UltraLog 
model performs better under the following conditions:
1. It is good to have an equal number of MSB, FSB and 
Battalion but impractical due to high 
implementation cost.
2. A more practical approach is to have an equal 
number of FSB and Battalion.
3. We will not recommend an equal number of MSB 
and FSB
From these observations, a possible rule of thumb is as 
follows:
Nos. of FSB = Nos. of Battalion > Nos. of MSB
We must caution that these results are obtained from 
simulations ran during the workshop. It is necessary to check 
that these observations are true for other configurations that 
are not ran during the workshop. Furthermore, it will be good 
to perform the simulation for other network size. 
CONCLUSIONS
As conclusion, we found that this approach provide a “good 
enough” answer for a quick study and highlight some 
important trends in the result. The data-farming capability of 
NetLogo software allows the users to run multiple scenarios 
within reasonable time.
We also made the following improvements to the model:
a. Node recovery. In a  real network, a node will 
recover after a disruption. Hence, it will be more 
realistic to consider how a node will recover in the 
model. For the workshop, we have implemented a 
simple node recovery mechanism.
b. Node replenishment. When a supplier is disrupted, 
a customer will source for a new supplier. We have 
also implemented a simple replenishment policy 
that a node will look for new node to link to, after 
its supplying node fails.
c. Output analysis. Apart from the capability to run 
multiple scenarios, the next important step is to 
facilitate the analysis of this huge amount of 
simulation outputs. We implemented the analysis 
tool in VBA and Java.
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